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Technoscience, Neuroscience and the Subject of Politics 
 
One of the central tenets of today’s hegemonic ideology holds that the “end” of 
metaphysics has opened up the horizon for a post-metaphysical recognition of the 
narrative character of history, society, knowledge, truth, and the subject. While this 
narrative model has been dominant for quite some time in historiography, in 
philosophies of history, in sociological accounts of mass media and even in some 
psychoanalytic accounts, postmodern-hermeneutic philosophers such as Gianni 
Vattimo have even claimed that the most recent developments in the positive sciences 
– that have taken on the form of technoscience - can no longer simply be 
characterized in terms of objectification, availability and calculability, but rather in 
terms of a tendency towards incalculability and non-objectivity.1 That is, scientific 
attempts to objectify “nature” have led to a dissolution of their object into narratives 
that are to be interpreted. Thus, technoscience no longer speaks of objective facts, but 
of hypotheses and interpretations. Consequently, it is claimed that some kind of  
aesthetic-narrative model is operative even in accounts of new paradigms within the 
domain of technoscience.  
 
It is contemporary technoscience itself that transforms the world into a place where 
there are no longer facts guided by the “principle of reality”, but only multiple 
narratives that are to be interpreted and judged without having recourse to 
traditionally modern metaphysical, legitimating meta-narratives. In short, 
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technoscience has become an anti-model to stable systems, a model for open systems 
no longer allowing for some unity of reason, language or subject.2 
 
Taking as his point of departure Heidegger’s definition of modernity as “the age of 
the world picture”, Vattimo attempts to draw the nihilistic consequences from the 
modern production of the Weltbild, in that the point where science’s movement to the 
extreme of calculability leads to a general incalculability, that is, to the dissolution of 
the world picture into conflicting images, marks “a first flashing of the new event of 
Being”3 to the extent that it brings with it a dissolution of the metaphysical traits of 
experience. This weakening or erosion of metaphysical reality implies that reality is 
“the result of the intersection and ‘contamination’ … of a multiplicity of images, 
interpretations and reconstructions … without ‘central’ coordination.”4  
 
Recasting the objectivity of reality in terms of a complex, dense, and non-transparent 
technological web of images entails also consequences for the traditional 
metaphysical conception of the subject. Similar to the weakening of reality and world 
“into a sort of residue, a crystallization of the ‘conflict of interpretations’”,5 the 
subject can be less and less conceived of as a “center of self-consciousness and 
decision-making, reduced as it is to being the author of statistically predicted choices, 
playing a multiplicity of social roles that are irreducible to a unity.”6 That is to say, 
the postmodern-hermeneutic interpretation of the contemporary constellation of 
science and technology opens up the domain of shifting identities, thereby announcing 
and performing the end of the Cartesian cogito. The metaphysical distinction between 
subject and self  has become obsolete, in so far as the subject now becomes reducible 
to and identical with a multiplicity of “selves”, of “partial centers”. 
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Finally, a “collateral benefit” of technoscience’s production of a plural society is the 
“radical transformation … in the nature of political power.”7 That is, by dissolving 
metaphysical accounts of objective reality and of the subject, contemporary 
technoscience’s own de-centering has enabled democracy to come into its own. The 
essential link between science and technology on the one hand, democracy on the 
other, can be discerned in their respective emancipatory possibilities, in that they 
partake “in the dissolution of the strong, centralized, authoritarian structures of 
political power, thus contributing decisively … to create the chance for being to give 
itself (to occur, to presence) outside metaphysics’ violent and objectifying patterns.”8  
 
Hence Vattimo’s declaration: “The end of metaphysics has its genuine political 
parallel in the strengthening of democracy.”9 It is only this postmodern ontology of 
the weakening of Being – a weakening brought about precisely and decisively by 
contemporary constellation of science and technology – that can supply 
“philosophical reasons for preferring a liberal, tolerant, and democratic society rather 
than an authoritarian and totalitarian one.”10  
 
As if to provide a further exemplification and illustration of Vattimo’s thesis that 
contemporary science is the principal agent in the pluralizing dissolution of central 
modern metaphysical concepts, Daniel Dennett’s magnificent Consciousness 
Explained endeavors, precisely by means of a neuroscientific account of the 
emergence of (self-)consciousness out of physical, biological processes, to “weaken” 
the Cartesian theater (the cogito) (as well as the Freudian unconscious) into a mere, 
always temporary and provisional, “center of narrative gravity.” 
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According to Dennett, the Cartesian theater is a false “metaphorical picture of how 
conscious experience must sit in the brain”;11 that is, against this false assumption 
governing Cartesian dualism as well as various types of materialism in the wake of 
Descartes, one has to recognize that, once the res cogitans is discarded, “there is no 
longer a role for a centralized gateway or indeed for any functional center to the brain. 
The pineal gland is not only not the fax machine to the Soul, it is also not the Oval 
Office of the brain, and neither are any other portions of the brain.”12 Thus, Dennett 
proposes the “multiple drafts” model in which “all varieties of perception – indeed, all 
varieties of thought or mental activity – are accomplished in the brain by parallel, 
multi-track processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs.”13 Dennett 
leaves the space of theater (with its observer) and moves to a process of production 
that is to illuminate further the multiple drafts model: a kind of (re-)writing project or, 
to be more precise, a kind of  perpetual editorialism:  
 
 
In the world of publishing there is a traditional and usually quite hard-edged 
distinction between pre-publication editing, and post-publication correction of 
‘errata’. In the academic world today, however, things have been speeded up 
by electronic communication. With the advent of word-processing and desktop 
publishing and electronic mail, it now often happens that several different 
drafts of an article are simultaneously in circulation, with the author readily 
making revisions in response to comments received by electronic mail. Fixing 
the moment of publication, and thus calling one of the drafts of the article the 
canonical text – the text of record, the one to cite in a bibliography – becomes 
a somewhat arbitrary manner.14  
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This passage seems to entertain a certain affinity between neuroscientific findings and 
some of Vattimo’s claims - not only with regard to the significance of both 
technoscience and neuroscience concerning (the production) of meaning, but also with 
regard to the transformations that both object and subject undergo within the frame of 
technoscience and neuroscience: what occurs in both frameworks on the object-side 
amounts to a dissolution of substance, of authority and finality; and on the side of the 
subject, one finds a dissolution to the cogito and its instantaneity in that all temporal 
stability is relinquished for the sake of an appeal to multiple drafts or narratives in 
order to account for the generation of the self out of the interactions of the 
mechanisms of consciousness. 
 
This perpetual editorialism also characterizes the way in which Dennett inscribes 
language into his project of elaborating a theory naturalizing consciousness. In 
analogy to discarding the res cogitans, he dismisses, in the field of language, 
assumptions about a “Central Meaner” or a “Conceptualizer”; instead, he replaces 
these two particular images of a centralized bureaucracy with a “pandemonium of 
word demons”, of competing forces (words, phrases, syntactic figures) generating a 
universe of tinkering and opportunistic enlisting. Meaning thus becomes displaced, 
dislocated from a surreptitiously assumed central location. 
 
Dennett conceptualizes the human mind in terms of a multitude of vaguely 
coordinated soft wares or programs created by evolution, over-determining the 
structure of the human mind in such a way that one can neither identify isolated 
particular organs with clearly defined functions nor a universal self coordinating 
between them; rather, some particular program or narrative fragment can temporarily 
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assume the coordinating function, preventing the “pandemonium of word demons” 
from regressing into chaos “thanks to good meta-habits that tend to entertain coherent, 
purposeful sequences rather than an interminable helter-skelter power grab.”15  
The plasticity of the brain forms the evolutionary backdrop for Dennett’s 
neuroscientific explanation of meta-habits. Although nervous systems are more or less 
hard-wired and usually fully adequate to cope with the environment of an organism, 
the “plastic brain is capable of reorganizing itself adaptively in response to particular 
novelties in the organism’s environment.”16 It is this very plasticity of the brain that 
allows for the installation of new and flexible softwares atop the more rigid platform 
of the brain’s hardware. Dennett’ s account of the formation of meta-habits passes 
through auto-stimulation, memes and the “virtual machine”, finally arriving at 
“human consciousness as a huge complex of memes … that can be best understood as 
the operation of a … virtual machine implemented in the parallel architecture of the 
brain that was not designed for any such activities.”17 This installation of a virtual 
machine creates “thousands or millions of billions of connection-strength settings 
between neurons, which all together in concert give the underlying hardware a new 
set of macro-habits, a set of conditional regularities of behavior.”18  
 
Finally, the self has to be interpreted rather as “an abstraction defined by the myriads 
of attributions … that have composed the biography of the living body whose Center 
of Narrative Gravity it is.”19 For “an advanced agent must build up practices for 
keeping track of both its bodily and ‘mental’ circumstances. In human beings, … 
those practices mainly involve bouts of storytelling and story checking, some of it 
factual and some of it fictional.”20 Ultimately, the self reveals itself to be a narrative 
fiction, but an effective fiction. Dennett writes: “’Call me Dan,’ you hear from my lips, 
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and you oblige, not by calling my lips Dan, or my body Dan, but by calling me Dan, 
the theorist’s fiction created by … well, not by me but by my brain, acting in concert 
over the years with my parents and siblings and friends.”21  
 
Dennett’s evolutionary narrative (that is also and at the same time a narrative about 
the evolutionary development of narrative) does not only intend to explain some kind 
of direct passage from natural to symbolic environs, from nature to culture, but also to 
foreclose definitively any space for the articulation of the Cartesian cogito (or of the 
Freudian unconscious). For what they both presuppose is “a unified agent (the subject, 
the unconscious), which controls and directs the course of events, and Dennett’s point 
is, precisely, that there is no such agent.”22 However, instead of relegating both the 
Cartesian cogito (and the Freudian unconscious) into the dustbin of (the) history (of 
philosophy), Slavoj Žižek attempts to show in his largely sympathetic reading of 
Dennett that, precisely, Dennett’s recourse to an evolutionary account of the 
emergence of narrative bears witness to some “repressed”. That is to say, Dennett’s 
narrative conception of (self-)consciousness, according to which conscious experience 
and self-identity emerge out of “opportunistic tinkering” within a field of the 
multiplicity of memes vying for hegemony fails to account “for the very form of 
narrative – where does the subject’s capacity to organize its contingent experience 
into the form of the narrative come from? Everything can be explained this way 
except the narrative form itself, which, in a way, must already be there.”23 What 
remains unaccounted for in Dennett’s theoretical mixture of the experimental and the 
interpretative is the very passage – via negativity - from nature/biology to culture; the 
recourse to the figure of narrative seems to obscure the space and the cut or gap 
separating the neuronal from the mental by relaying scientific explanation by 
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interpretation; in other words, the failure to account for the very form of narrative 
preceding its content – which, in Dennett, is simply presupposed -, can be deciphered 
as “the unfailing index of the violent repression of some traumatic content”;24 in 
addition, is Dennett’s evolutionary-narrative account regarding the passage from 
nature to culture without any theoretical fissure not ideological, in so far as “narrative 
as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by way of 
rearranging its terms into a temporal succession?”25 
 
Dennett’s text turns out to be woven by complex layers of different narratives:26 first, 
the functioning of the brain is accounted for in terms of multiple drafts or narratives; 
then, an evolutionary narrative is inscribed into this model (about the multi-narrative 
structure of the brain). Finally, this narrative of natural history seems to project a 
concurrent narrative of social history that reveals itself in turn as a highly condensed 
story about the postmodern condition, in that one decisive figurality permeates, 
organizes and gives consistency to Dennett’s textual narrative: the figurality of the 
political. That is to say, the Cartesian theater is not only a false scientific model, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, a false political representational medium: for it is 
“dictatorial”, a simulation of the “Oval Office”; it operates with the assumption of a 
“Boss”, a “Central Meaner” or “Conceptualizer”. Ultimately, what hides on the 
centralized stage of the Cartesian theater is the (bureaucratic, centralized) State. What 
is the alternative?  
 
 
It is all very well to equip oneself with an ‘All hands on deck!’ subroutine, but 
then, once all hands are on deck, one must have some way of coping with the 
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flood of volunteers. We should not expect there to have been a convenient 
captain already at hand …, so conflicts between volunteers had to sort 
themselves out without any higher executive.27  
 
 
However, it is here that “an internal political miracle” can be discerned, in so far as 
the de-centered brain “creates a virtual captain of the crew, without elevating any of 
them to long-term dictatorial power. Who’s in charge? First one coalition and then 
another, shifting in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-habits …”.28  
 
Consequently, Dennett’s naturalist “explanation” of consciousness carries within itself 
the – neuroscientifically substantiated - claim to a vision of politics whose contours 
may be discerned in terms of a conception of a radical, anti-essentialist and 
decentralized democracy whose political understanding and practice of commanding 
resembles recent theories of hegemony. Dennett’s account shows not only that brain 
has a history and is a history – that is, a constitutive historicity of the brain -, but also 
a consciousness of this historicity, encapsulated in his particular radical-democratic 
political vision.29 
 
What thus come to the fore is the question of the relation between the neuronal and 
the political. In a way, Dennett’s vision of the brain is political: neuronal functioning 
as described by Dennett quite closely resembles a democracy; thus, in one sense, 
Dennett’s explanation of consciousness has certainly “contributed to the political 
emancipation of the brain”;30 on the other hand, would one not also have to 
interrogate whether his “scientific description of the brain engenders a certain 
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normalizing vision of democracy, in that it accords an overly central role to the 
absence of center, a too rigid prominence to plasticity as flexibility?”31 Is his narrative 
of multiple drafts to be understood as mere polymorphism, open to all forms, all 
shifting identities, all subjectivations within the neuronal-democratic frame, or does it 
also open up a space for a negation of and resistance to democracy that could not that 
easily be dismissed as some kind of “totalitarianism”? 
 
Thus, are not both Vattimo’s postmodern-hermeneutic and Dennett’s postmodern-
scientific theories, precisely in pretending to raise the veil (their critique of 
Cartesianism as philosophical, scientific, and political theory), perhaps reinforcing a 
different veil (that of democratic fundamentalism) in producing no critical analysis of 
what might drive both contemporary technoscience and neuroscience? By ascribing to 
postmodern multi-narrative cerebral and technoscientific structures the weakening 
force that creates the conditions for the democratic proliferation of multiple fluid 
narratives and (communal) identities, both may have neglected capital’s force of 
deterritorialization providing the very (disavowed) horizon for the affirmation of 
playful, fictive narrative differences playing across all boundaries. And if it is correct, 
that neuronal man is never simply a neuronal given, but also a political and 
ideological construction, what can be done so that accounts of neuro-science and 
techno-science do not simply naturalize democracy as the political mode of 
organization? After all, if liberal pluralist democracy with its ideology of narrative 
self-fashioning and of flexible, adaptable and ultimately docile identities continues to 
be the political form of (late) capitalism covering up the antagonism constitutive of 
the economic-political process, should one not attempt to free neuroscience and 
technoscience precisely from unwittingly reproducing the current socioeconomic 
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organization by subjecting them to an ideology critique that unlocks their potential as 
explosive sites? 
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